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When Vultures Attack
BALANCING THE RIGHT TO IMMUNITY AGAINST
RECKLESS SOVEREIGNS
INTRODUCTION
As the global economy slowly transitions from recession
to recovery,1 a critical question remains: what (or who) caused
the Great Recession? Michael Lewis’s Boomerang documented
the ensuing blame game in the United States:
[Americans had] been conditioned to grab as much as they could,
without thinking about the long-term consequences. Afterward, the
people on Wall Street would privately bemoan the low morals of the
American people who walked away from their subprime loans, and
the American people would express outrage at the Wall Street people
who paid themselves a fortune to design bad loans.2

While some might be quick to identify such greed and
dysfunction as uniquely American, Lewis highlighted a similar
search for answers elsewhere:
[By summer of 2011,] the Greek parliament debated and voted on a
bill to [cut government benefits]. Thousands [took] to the streets to
protest the bill [including] tax collectors on the take, public-school
teachers who don’t really teach [and] state hospital workers bribed
to buy overpriced supplies . . . Here they are, and here we are: a
nation of people looking for anyone to blame but themselves.3

Faced with a global recession, opposing political parties,
different social classes, and entire nations were quick to blame
one another for the ensuing economic chaos. When economic
uncertainty impacts highly sophisticated financial transactions
and disputes arise that cannot be resolved voluntarily, the
parties may end up in court.

1

See generally Barbara Kollmeyer, Post-Recession Recovery Is Taking A Lot Longer
this Time, Says OECD, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 27, 2012), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/
thetell/2012/11/27/post-recession-recovery-is-taking-a-lot-longer-this-time-says-oecd/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
2
MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG: TRAVELS IN THE NEW THIRD WORLD 202 (2011).
3
Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
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In the July 2011 decision of NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco
Central de la República Argentina (NML Capital),4 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded a pair of
hedge funds,5 EM Ltd. and NML Capital, Ltd., of the risks of
engaging
in
cross-border
transactions
with
foreign
governments. These particular hedge funds, known as “vulture
funds” for their aggressive investment and litigation tactics,6
attempted to attach7 $105 million in Argentine assets8 to satisfy
almost $2.4 billion in judgments that had already been entered
against the Republic of Argentina (Republic).9 The assets were
deposited in the account of the Central Bank of Argentina
(BCRA) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)10
11
and, pursuant to the terms of the transactions at issue, the
vulture funds brought suit against both the Republic and the
BCRA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York.

4

652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).
A hedge fund is “an investing group usually in the form of a limited
partnership that employs speculative techniques in the hope of obtaining large capital
gains.” Hedge Fund Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/hedge%20fund (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
6
See Jonathan C. Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt
May Force a Revision of the Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 n.7
(2008) (“Vulture funds are companies that purchase the debt of poorer countries at
reduced rates then sue that nation for the full value of the debt plus interest.”). For a
history of how the secondary market for sovereign debt emerged and the problems it
created, see Elizabeth Broomfield, Survey, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing
Government Caps on Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
473, 483-85 (2010).
7
Attachment is “[t]he seizing of a person’s property to secure a judgment or
to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (9th ed. 2009).
Execution is the “[j]udicial enforcement of a money judgment, usu[ally] by seizing and
selling the judgment debtor’s property . . . .” Id. at 650.
8
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 178 (“[W]hen plaintiffs moved, for the first time,
to attach the . . . funds [Argentina] maintained approximately $105 million in its
account at the [Federal Reserve Bank of New York].”)
9
For a list of the judgments entered in favor of NML Capital, Ltd. and EM
Ltd. on principal and interest payments, see id. at 176 n.6.
10
EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (EM II), 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated sub nom. NML Capital, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). The
BCRA used its FRBNY account for typical central bank functions, including
maintaining “required cash reserves [of] Argentine banks,” settling foreign exchange
transactions, and providing U.S. dollars to Argentine domestic banks. Id. at 290-91.
11
See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.5 (“It is undisputed that in the terms
and conditions governing each of the securities at issue in this case the Republic agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of any New York state or federal court sitting in the
Borough of Manhattan, The City of New York . . . over any suit, action, or proceeding
against it or its properties, assets or revenues with respect to [these securities] . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
5
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The court based its analysis on the Foreign Sovereign
12
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et
13
seq., a federal statute that shields foreign states from being
sued in U.S. courts as long as their activities are
14
noncommercial. However, given the fact that the work of a
foreign state’s central bank is commercial by nature, the FSIA
includes a provision specifically preventing the attachment of
foreign central bank property “held for [the foreign central
15
bank’s] own account . . . .” To determine whether the vulture
funds could attach the assets, the court dealt with two
important issues: “whether the funds [were] the property of the
16
BCRA ‘held for its own account’ under § 1611(b)(1)” and
whether
the
Republic
nonetheless
“explicit[ly]
and
17
unambiguous[ly]” waived the immunity of the BCRA. The
court held that the funds were the property of the BCRA “held
18
for its own account,” and that the Republic did not waive the
19
BCRA’s immunity in its transactions with the vulture funds.
Although the assets at issue represented less than five percent
20
of the vulture funds’ judgments, their pursuit of assets at one
21
of the world’s most secure banks represented a test of the
practicality and efficacy of the FSIA.
12

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006)). In this note, I will refer to this Act as the FSIA.
13
See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 196-97. While sovereign immunity refers to
“[a] government’s immunity from being sued in its own courts without its consent,”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (9th ed. 2009), foreign immunity describes “[t]he
immunity of a foreign sovereign, its agents, and its instrumentalities from litigation in
[another country’s] courts.” Id. For purposes of this note, foreign sovereign immunity is
synonymous with foreign immunity.
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
15
28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
16
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 191.
17
Id. at 197.
18
28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
19
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 196.
20
The vulture funds had $2.4 billion in uncollected judgments against
Argentina and the BCRA only had $105 million in the FRBNY, or about 4.4 percent of
what it owed. See supra note 9.
21
See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Federal Reserve Bank of New York at 3-4,
NML Capital, 652 F.3d 172 (No. 10-1487-cv(L)) (describing how “[t]he FRBNY has
accounts for approximately 250 foreign central banks and monetary authorities around
the world” and how, “[a]s of December 31, 2009, the balances in these accounts totaled
nearly $3 trillion, which represent[ed] approximately 50% of worldwide U.S. dollardenominated reserves”). The money at the FRBNY serves many critical functions for
world financial markets: (1) most of the world holds some reserve currency here; (2)
such large holdings promote the United States and New York City as financial centers;
(3) the foreign investments at the FRBNY helps the United States government finance
its public debt and lower interest rates; and (4) such benefits “promote the U.S. dollar
as the world’s main currency.” Id. Both the FRBNY and the U.S. government wrote
amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Republic. See generally id.; Brief for the United
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This note will argue that amendments to the 1976
statute might clarify its original intent: to protect foreign
governments from suit when they act as sovereigns. Part I of
the note sets forth the purpose and relevant provisions of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Part II recounts the extensive
litigation between the Republic and the vulture funds. Part III
discusses problems with the construction of the FSIA, proposes a
revision, and explains the need for a special interpretation of
foreign central bank assets as envisioned by the NML Capital
decision. Finally, Part IV explains why this litigation has reached
a stalemate and the impact of powerful political and economic
considerations on the NML Capital decision.
I.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: PURPOSE
AND STRUCTURE

Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in 1976 as a response to the modern reality that Americans and,
more importantly, American corporations were “increasingly
coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by
foreign states.”22 Both the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees noted that the United States was behind because
“[u]nlike other legal systems, U.S. law does not afford plaintiffs
and their counsel with a means to commence a suit that is
specifically addressed to foreign state defendants.”23
Unsurprisingly, the bill’s congressional hearings focused on the
legislation’s benefits for constituents with colorable claims
against foreign states, which included obtaining “satisfaction of
[a] judgment through execution against ordinary commercial
assets.”24 On the other hand, some of the bill’s most powerful
provisions—and those at issue in NML Capital—provided
guidance to foreign states on asserting the sovereign immunity
defense,25 which helps prevent “significant foreign relations
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, NML Capital, 652 F.3d
172 (No. 10-1487-cv(L)). Among the reasons cited by the FRBNY for its support of
shielding the assets from attachment was the FRBNY’s “substantial interest in a stable
and certain legal environment for foreign central bank assets.” Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra, at 4. The FRBNY also explained that its
account holders want “assurance that their accounts at the FRBNY are protected under
U.S. law” and expect that their “reserves . . . [held] outside of the United States” will be
protected by “reciprocal international principles of central bank immunity.” Id. at 4.
22
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605, 6630.
23
Id. at 7.
24
Id.
25
Id.
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problems” that arise upon execution against the reserves of
foreign states.26
A.

Immunity as the Basic Premise of the FSIA

The default rule for suing a foreign governmental entity
is simple: it cannot be done.27 The FSIA allows for exceptions to
the general grant of immunity, however, which emerged from a
doctrine known as “restrictive sovereign immunity.”28 Under
the doctrine, state acts that are “sovereign or governmental in
nature” are immune from suit, but those that are commercial
or normally performed by private persons are not.29 As Deputy
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State in 1952, Jack B.
Tate traced the rationale behind stripping immunity from the
commercial activities of a foreign state in a letter addressed to
U.S. Attorney General James McGranery30:
[T]he Department [of State] feels that the widespread and increasing
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons
doing business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy
to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of
sovereign immunity.31

Borne of a desire to protect the business interests of
American citizens transacting with foreign states abroad, the
commercial activity exception has formed one of the primary
battlegrounds for claims aimed at defeating immunity and has
left courts to decide the commerciality of a number of novel
issues—for example, furnishing residential space to diplomats,32
26

Id. at 31.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (stating that a “foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States” subject to
certain exceptions); see also id. § 1609 (stating that “the property in the United States
of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment” subject to similar exceptions).
28
Id. §§ 1605, 1610 (outlining the commercial activity exceptions to
immunity from suit and attachment); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14.
29
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14.
30
See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 71115 (1976) (Letter from Jack B. Tate, Sec’y of State, to James McGranery, Attorney
General (May 19, 1952)).
31
Id. at 714.
32
See City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations,
No. 03-CV-3256 (RCCFM), 2004 WL 2710040, at *1-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2000)
(granting plaintiff’s discovery request for documents relating to the acquisition of real
property for residential purposes in order to establish that embassy engaged in
commercial activity).
27
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discriminating against employees,33 and taking hostages.34
Resolving these issues has left a rich but complicated
jurisprudence, especially as foreign states and their
instrumentalities engage in increasingly complex financial
transactions with private parties.35
B.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Key
Provisions and Jurisprudence
1. What Is a “Foreign State”?

According to 28 U.S.C. § 1603, a “‘foreign state’ . . . includes
a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”36 To qualify as an agency or
instrumentality according to § 1603(b)(1), the governmental
entity must be a “separate legal person.”37 Although FSIA

33

See Shih v. Taipei Econ. & Cultural Representative Office, 693 F. Supp. 2d
805, 811 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (concluding that employment discrimination was not “peculiar
to sovereigns” and therefore constituted commercial activity).
34
See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(arguing that “kidnapping by itself cannot possibly be described as an act typically
performed by participants in the market (unless one distorts the notion of a
marketplace to include a hostage bazaar),” even though “money was allegedly sought
from relatives of the hostages . . . .”).
35
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d
172, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2011) (private bondholders unsuccessfully sought attachment of
Argentine central bank assets located in the United States to satisfy judgments
entered against Argentina after their 2001 default on bonds purchased in the
secondary market by respondents); Wasserstein Perella Emerging Mkts. Fin., L.P. v.
Province of Formosa, No. 97-CV-793(BSJ), 2000 WL 573231, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. May
11, 2000) (Argentine province’s failure to pay a Cayman Islands-based investment
bank hired to raise money for a loan is commercial in character and, therefore, not
subject to the FSIA).
36
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006).
37
Id. § 1603(b):
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
For a discussion of the relevance of the other “agency or instrumentality” requirements
for foreign central banks, see Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 350-60 (2003). For an in-depth discussion of the “organ
of a foreign state” requirement of § 1603(b)(2), see Michael A. Granne, Defining “Organ
of a Foreign State” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS

2013]

IMMUNITY FOR RECKLESS SOVEREIGNS?

1103

jurisprudence includes many cases involving monetary
authorities,38 the statute does not define the term central bank.39
This omission has engendered multiple interpretations of § 1603’s
relevance for foreign central banks.40 When a foreign central bank
has the status of a separate legal person for FSIA purposes,41 it
confers an important benefit: it limits its own “liability for the
acts of its parent government . . .” by acquiring “the sovereign
character of its parent government for immunity purposes.”42 As
such, foreign governments and their instrumentalities often argue
that each entity is a separate legal person and, therefore, that one
cannot be held liable for the debts of the other.43
In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), the U.S. Supreme Court explored
two circumstances in which the presumption of an
instrumentality’s independent legal personhood, or “separate
juridical status,” should be set aside—a result that would place
liability on the instrumentality for the acts of its parent
government.44 In that case, Bancec, a short-lived foreign trade
bank of Cuba in the months following the 1959 Cuban
Revolution, had an agreement with Citibank, a private
American bank, to ship sugar to Mississippi.45 Bancec shipped
the sugar and sued Citibank in New York when it failed to
pay.46 Citibank did not pay because the newly installed
L. REV. 1 (2008). For purposes of clarity, the word “instrumentality” will be used
instead of “agency or instrumentality.” See infra Part III.
38
See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba
(Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 613 (1983) LNC Invs., Inc. v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 228
F.3d 423, 423 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1994); Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru v. Riggs Nat’l
Bank, 919 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1994).
39
See Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 525 (2002) [hereinafter Working
Group] (noting that “other federal statutes and court decisions provide guidance” on
defining “central bank”).
40
Compare NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 196-97 (citing section 1611(b)(1) for
foreign central bank analysis under FSIA), with Lee, supra note 37, at 350 (arguing
that such an analysis must logically begin with section 1603 because if it did not, FSIA
would not apply to central banks because they would not be foreign states and,
therefore, they would never qualify for immunity).
41
See Lee, supra note 37, at 350 n.81 (“The legislative history of the FSIA
reflects [the] presupposition [that] as a general matter, entities which meet the
definition of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state could assume a variety of
forms, including . . . a central bank . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42
See id. at 360. For the purposes of this note, a parent government is a
foreign state as defined by FSIA that is not an instrumentality.
43
See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 617 (1983).
44
Id. at 630.
45
Id. at 614.
46
Id. at 614-15.
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communists in Cuba expropriated all of Citibank’s property in
Cuba.47 As a result, Citibank brought counterclaims for an offset
on the value of its Cuban property in lieu of paying Bancec for
the sugar.48 The Court rejected the Cuban government’s
argument that Bancec was legally separate from the parent
government49 and adhered to precedent by stating that separate
juridical status would be ignored (1) “where a corporate entity is
so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of
principal and agent is created[,]”50 or (2) when recognition of
independent legal personhood “would work fraud or injustice.”51
Explaining the first prong, the Court analogized the
parent government–instrumentality relationship to that of a
parent corporation and its subsidiary.52 Under principles of
corporate law, a subsidiary53 is considered legally separate from
its parent corporation,54 but the “corporate veil,”55 which limits
the corporation’s liability for the subsidiary’s acts, may be
pierced if “[d]ominion [is] so complete, interference so
obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be
a principal and the subsidiary an agent.”56 When the principal
controls the agent in this manner, courts label the agent as the
47

Id.
Id. at 616.
49
Id. at 632-33.
50
Id. at 629 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-04
(1960)). It is important to not confuse the U.S. Supreme Court’s reference to “agent”
with the idea of “agency” as used in FSIA. When a court decides that an entity, such as
a foreign central bank, is an agent of its principal (i.e., its parent government), it
effectively erases the distinction between foreign states and agencies or
instrumentalities and thereby creates a principal-agent relationship between the
parent government and foreign central bank. See EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated sub nom. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República
Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). When the principal-agent relationship is
created, the agent becomes the alter ego of the principal and “could be liable for the
debts of the [principal].” Id.
51
Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629 (citing Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307,
322 (1939)).
52
Id. at 630.
53
A “subsidiary corporation” is “[a] corporation in which a parent corporation
has a controlling share.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (9th ed. 2009).
54
See, e.g., Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d
265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929).
55
See generally I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 496-97 (1912) (coining the phrase “pierc[ing] the veil” to describe
situations in which a corporation’s separate legal status should be disregarded because the
corporation attempts “to commit iniquity, to perpetrate fraud, to achieve monopoly, or to
accomplish wrongs, under the guise, and hiding behind the veil, of corporate existence”).
56
N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960) (quoting Berkey
v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)). See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF AGENCY § 219 (1933) (“[A] master is subject to liability for injuries caused by
the tortious conduct of servants within the scope of their employment.”).
48
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“alter ego” of the principal, and one can be held liable for the
acts of the other.57
The second prong represents general equitable
principles of justice and fairness. In Bancec, the Cuban
government used the corporate form in an attempt to avoid its
obligations to Citibank.58 The Court explained that it was not
fair to allow Cuba to invoke American law under the FSIA to
avoid Citibank’s rightful counterclaim.59 The Court argued that
this situation mirrored that in National City Bank v. Republic
of China—the foreign state “wants our law, like any other
litigant, but it wants our law free from the claims of justice.”60
In such circumstances, the Court found it fair to ignore the
corporate form.
2. The Commercial Activity Exceptions
The FSIA provides for two types of commercial activity
exceptions: the commercial exception to immunity from suit
under § 1605(a)(2)61 and the commercial exception to immunity
from attachment under § 1610(a)(2) and (b)(2).62 The difference

57

See Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60, 75 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting 1
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 41.10 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[I]f the shareholders or the
corporations themselves disregard the proper formalities of a corporation, then the law
will do likewise as necessary to protect individual and corporate creditors.”).
58
Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630-32 (1983).
59
Id. at 630.
60
Id. at 632 (quoting Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 36162 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006):
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case—
....
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign states; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign states elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States . . . .
62

See id. § 1610(a)(2):

(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section
1603(a) . . . , used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be
immune from attachment . . . upon a judgment entered by a court of the United
States or of a State . . . if—
....
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between immunity from suit and immunity from attachment is
important: the latter will only apply if plaintiffs successfully
bring the defendant foreign state within the court’s jurisdiction
and obtain a judgment.63
Section 1605(a)(2) strips a foreign state of its immunity
when state action is “based upon a commercial activity . . . .”64
Under § 1603(d), commercial activity “means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose.”65 While the statute clearly demands
that courts determine commerciality by looking at the foreign
state’s actions rather than its motives, the statute leaves a
critical word, commercial, undefined.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.66 filled this
statutory gap. To encourage international trade, Argentina
offered a program to its domestic businesses whereby the
government would provide them with U.S. dollars in exchange
for Argentine pesos.67 When the program failed as a result of
Argentina’s insufficient U.S. dollar reserves, Argentina
refinanced the foreign exchange agreements by issuing bonds
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim was based . . . .
....
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of
an . . . instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in
the United States shall not be immune from attachment . . . upon a judgment
entered by a court of the United States or of a State . . . if—
....
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the . . . instrumentality is not
immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(2) . . . regardless of whether the property
is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based . . . .
(emphasis added); see also Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d
240, 254-55 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining some of the differences between sections 1605
and 1610).
63
See Lee, supra note 37, at 375 (noting that “[i]t is one thing to obtain a
judgment against a foreign state or agency or instrumentality, but quite another to
recover on it”).
64
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
65
Id. § 1603(d).
66
504 U.S. 607 (1992).
67
Id. at 609 (describing how this policy would stimulate international trade
because “Argentina’s currency is not one of the mediums of exchange accepted on the
international market” and, therefore, Argentine businesses engaging in foreign
transactions needed U.S. dollars).
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that guaranteed repayment to all affected foreign creditors.68
But as the repayment date approached, Argentina concluded
that it could not pay on the bonds, so it unilaterally extended the
time for payment and issued another round of agreements
promising future payment.69 Foreign creditors refused, however.70
Instead, the foreign creditors sued Argentina under § 1605(a)(2),
arguing that these transactions were commercial activities.71
The Supreme Court sided with the foreign creditors,
finding that Argentina’s borrowing activity was commercial
under the FSIA because it acted as “a private player within [a
market]” rather than as a regulator.72 By focusing on the nature
rather than the purpose of a transaction, the Court broadened
the commercial activity exception and brought an arguably
governmental program within the exception. In effect, it no
longer mattered “why Argentina participated in the bond market
in the manner of a private actor; it matters only that it did so.”73
3. The Waiver Exceptions
Section 1605(a)(1) brings a foreign state under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts if the foreign state waived its
immunity “either explicitly or by implication.”74 But “[i]mplicit
waiver . . . is a second best approach, and a distant second at
that.”75 Courts’ tendencies to reject anything but an explicit

68

Id.
Id. at 610.
70
See id. The foreign creditors who brought the suit were two Panamanian
corporations and a Swiss bank, who were able to sue in New York because the bond
agreements “provide[d] for payment of interest and principal in United States
dollars . . . through transfer on the London, Frankfurt, Zurich, or New York
market . . . .” Id. at 609-10.
71
See id. at 612.
72
Id. at 620.
73
Id. at 608.
74
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006).
75
Lee, supra note 37, at 339; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617 (considering explicit and implicit waivers of
immunity by the foreign state. An explicit waiver would most likely be included in the
plain language of a contract. Implicit waivers may be found in cases “where a foreign
state has agreed to arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has agreed
that the law of a particular country should govern a contract.”); George K. Foster,
Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforcing Arbitral
Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some
Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 676 (2008) (“Explicit waivers
are often found in a contract between the sovereign and the creditor that predates the
dispute. Such a waiver can be of great value at the enforcement stage, should a dispute
ever arise, so it is always good practice for an investor to seek to include such a
provision when negotiating a contract with a foreign sovereign.”).
69
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waiver corroborate this perspective.76 Waiver issues are often
litigated concurrently with “alter ego” arguments, and a finding
that an instrumentality is the “alter ego” of the parent
government would mean that the parent government might have
waived its immunity through the instrumentality, as well.77 As a
result, courts often favor a “clear and unambiguous” approach to
drafting waivers,78 which explicitly names any agencies or
instrumentalities that are subject to the waiver of immunity.79
C.

Implications for Foreign Central Banks

For a variety of arguably noncommercial, governmental
transactions, Weltover casts doubt on a foreign central bank’s
ability to act “as financial agent for the government” without
subjecting itself to the commercial activity exceptions to
immunity from suit and attachment.80 One court stepped even
further by stating “[a] contract, implied or otherwise, is
inherently commercial, even when the ultimate purpose behind
it is governmental regulation.”81 Considering the pervasiveness
of contracts in the public sector, this view would swallow the
general rule of sovereign immunity.
Weltover’s broad interpretation of commerciality for
purposes of immunity from suit also has implications for
enforcement of judgments through attachment of property,

76

See, e.g., Eaglet Corp. v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 839 F. Supp. 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) aff’d, 23 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1994); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of
Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
77
See, e.g., EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d. 273, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) vacated sub nom.
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).
78
See Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 2010).
79
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 195-96 (holding that despite the Republic’s
broadly worded waiver of immunity in the bond instruments that plaintiffs purchased,
“it does not appear to clearly and unambiguously waive BCRA’s immunity . . . .”).
80
See Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank,15 F.3d 238, 243-44 (2d
Cir. 1994) (state-owned Iraqi bank not immune from suit when it did not honor its loan
guarantee); Weston Compagnie de Fin. et D’Investissement, S.A. v. La República del
Ecuador, 823 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Banco Central del Ecuador not
immune from suit after it defaulted on loan agreements with its Swiss creditor, a
financial institution which purchased Swiss debt); see also Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia,
930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991) (government financing for the purchase of military aircraft
considered commercial). But see De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385,
1394-95 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting a pre-Weltover consideration of the underlying purpose
of the transaction to hold that the Central Bank’s issuance of a check was governmental
even though check writing is private-like in nature).
81
Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1400 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (citations omitted).
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especially for central banks. Since central banks typically qualify
as instrumentalities under § 1603(b),82 it would appear that
Congress chose to provide a special rule for certain assets of a
foreign central bank. Section 1611(b)(1) provides that,
notwithstanding the provisions of § 1610, the property of a foreign
bank or monetary authority “held for its own account” is immune
from attachment . . . unless the central bank or monetary authority
or its parent foreign government has explicitly waived its immunity
from attachment . . . .83

The interplay between the commerciality of central bank
activities, the special protection from attachment the FSIA
affords foreign central bank property “held for its own
account,”84 and waivers of immunity set the stage for over ten
years of litigation between the Republic of Argentina and the
vulture funds.
II.

ARGENTINA’S DEFAULT AND SECOND CIRCUIT FSIA
INTERPRETATION: 2001–2011

Founded in 1935, the BCRA, by Argentine law, is “a
self-administered institution of the [Argentine] State,” charged
with representing the Republic’s financial interests with
foreign entities and regulating Argentina’s domestic banking
and financial sectors.85 These functions included a BCRA bank
account at the FRBNY for the management of the Republic’s
dollar reserves.86 When the Republic defaulted on $80 billion of
foreign-owned debt in 2001, it stopped principal and interest
payments on that debt.87 Although the economic situation in
Argentina following the 2001 default was extremely severe,88
82

See supra Part I.B.1.
See Lee, supra note 37, at 376 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Although instrumentalities enjoy sovereign-like immunity, an “instrumentality enjoys
immunity from attachment and execution on terms less generous than those applicable
to the [parent government] itself.” Id. at 360; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2), (b)(2)
(2006) (allowing creditors to attach property of a parent government “used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based . . . .” and expanding that
attachment right against instrumentalities “regardless of whether the property is or
was involved in the act upon which the claim is based”); id. § 1611(b)(1) (the special
central bank immunity provision).
84
28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
85
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172,
177 (2d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 175.
88
See Charles Newbery & Alexei Barrionuevo, As Greece Ponders Default,
Lessons from Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, (June 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/
24/business/global/24peso.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (“[In 2001], as Argentina slid
83
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some questioned Argentina’s claims that it could not pay its
debt in subsequent years, citing the fact that the Republic ran
surpluses in certain years following the default.89
Rather than participate in the Republic’s global
exchange offers between 2005 and 2010,90 which offered
creditors new securities for the nonperforming bonds on less
favorable terms,91 the vulture funds92 pursued claims for full
recovery on the original bond terms.93 The litigation against the
Republic and the BCRA in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York94 resulted in unpaid judgments
of almost $2.4 billion against the Republic since 2003.95 Saddled
with these interest-accruing judgments, a devalued Argentine
peso, and $9.8 billion in debts due to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Republic moved more than $32
billion out of its FRBNY account between 2001 and 2005 in an

toward financial collapse, banks barricaded themselves behind sheet metal to keep out
protesters demanding access to their life savings.”).
89
See EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The court must also
take into account the bad faith of the Republic following the default . . . . Indeed, the
record shows that during certain of [the ensuing] years the Republic ran a surplus.”),
vacated sub nom. NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 172.
90
See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.4 (explaining the terms of the 2005
and 2010 “global exchange offers”).
91
See Drew Benson & Eliana Raszewski, Argentina Offers 66% Haircut on
Defaulted Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-04-15/argentina-offers-new-bonds-to-holders-of-20-billion-debt-to-enddefault.html (reporting that the 2005 and 2010 restructurings offered similar terms,
with creditors receiving approximately thirty-four cents on the dollar).
92
See Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story Of How A Hedge Fund Detained
A Vessel In Ghana and Even Went For Argentina’s “Air Force One,” FORBES (Oct. 5,
2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-storybehind-the-argentine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-thepresidential-plane/ (identifying NML Capital as “a subsidiary of U.S. billionaire Paul
Singer’s Elliott Capital”); see also Karen De Witt, Exile’s Effort to Return Puts Focus on
Tax Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/10/01/us/exile-s-effort-to-return-puts-focus-on-tax-loophole.html (describing Kenneth
Dart, funder of EM Ltd., and his plan to return to the U.S. as consul for Belize, his
adopted country, after he renounced his American citizenship to avoid capital gains
and estate taxes).
93
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.6 (listing the various suits and judgments
between the vulture funds and the Republic).
94
See id. at 176 n.5 (“It is undisputed that in the terms and conditions
governing each of the securities at issue in this case the Republic agreed to submit to
the jurisdiction of any New York state or federal court sitting in the Borough of
Manhattan, The City of New York . . . over any suit, action, or proceeding against it or
its properties, assets, or revenues with respect to [these securities] . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006) (allowing explicit
waivers of jurisdictional immunity).
95
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.3 (aggregating judgments on principal and
interest payments).
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attempt to shield assets from its creditors.96 When the Republic
transferred $2.1 billion to its Swiss bank account within three
months,97 the vulture funds realized they were in danger of
failing to collect on their judgments and moved to attach the
$105 million in BCRA assets remaining in the BCRA’s FRBNY
account.98 These actions represented the beginning of a
prolonged legal battle between the Republic and vulture funds,
highlighted by two legal decisions: EM Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina (EM I)99 and NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de
la República Argentina (NML Capital).100
A.

The EM I Litigation: 2005–2007101

On December 30, 2005, the vulture funds successfully
moved to freeze the FRBNY funds through an ex parte
proceeding,102 but Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York vacated the
decision two weeks later.103 On appeal from the order vacating
the attachment orders, the vulture funds argued that the
Kirchner Decrees, two emergency executive decrees issued by
Argentina’s then-president Néstor Kirchner on December 15,
2005, effectively transferred ownership of the BCRA’s FRBNY

96

See id. at 178 (attributing the depletion of FRBNY assets to the cost of
“prop[ping] up” the value of the Argentine peso through the purchase of pesos with $20
billion and transfers of excess funds to “more protective jurisdictions . . . as a
preventive measure against possible wrongful attachment efforts by creditors of the
Republic” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
97
See id. at 177-78 (chronicling the BCRA’s account transfers); see also NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 8845 (TPG), 2011 WL 3897828, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was founded in
Switzerland in 1930 and “consists of 56 central banks or national monetary
authorities.” Id. It offers its accountholders “virtually absolute immunity from
attachment . . . under Swiss law” and does not accept deposits from national
governments, private individuals or corporations. Id.
98
See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 178.
99
EM I, 473 F.3d 463, 480-85 (2d Cir. 2007).
100
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 172.
101
In its 2011 decision NML Capital, the Second Circuit refers to its 2007
decision as EM I. The EM I designation is helpful because the 2010 District Court case
was decided under the name EM Ltd. as well. The author will refer to the 2011 District
Court case, reversed by the NML Capital decision, as EM II in order to distinguish the
2007 Second Circuit case from the 2011 District Court case.
102
EM I, 473 F.3d at 468-69.
103
See EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that an
earlier December 30, 2005 decision was reversed because (1) payments to the IMF were
not commercial activity and (2) the BCRA did not waive its immunity), vacated sub
nom. NML Capital, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).
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assets to the Republic.104 If plaintiffs had succeeded in this
argument, they would have been able to escape the broad grant
of immunity to central banks in § 1611(b)(1) of the FSIA
because the property would now be considered that of the
Republic, not the BCRA.105 As such, if the foreign state had
waived its immunity or the property had met the commercial
activity exception, the property would have been attachable
under § 1610.106
But the EM I court held otherwise, basing its decision
on three factors: (1) the distinction between the Republic’s
control over the BCRA and the BCRA’s control over the assets;
(2) the noncommercial nature of debt repayments to the IMF
from the BCRA’s FRBNY account; and (3) the subtle distinction
regarding the applicability of waivers of immunity.107 First, the
court explained that plaintiffs could not attach funds at the
FRBNY because the funds were held in the BCRA’s name, and
therefore the BCRA, not the Republic, possessed the property.108
Even if, as plaintiffs argued, the Kirchner Decrees had made it
possible for the President of the Republic “to appropriate (or
borrow) the [BCRA funds at the FRBNY] to pay Argentina’s
debts and then direct when and how the payment should be
made . . . ,”109 the Second Circuit explained that “the Republic’s
ability and willingness to control BCRA” did not necessarily
mean that the Republic controlled decisions over which assets
the BCRA would use to repay the IMF debt.110 Rather, the court
stated that the BCRA had discretion over the “specific funds”
that would service the debt.111
Even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ arguments about a
conversion of ownership from the BCRA to the Republic, the
court held that the commercial activity exception for foreign
states in § 1610(a)(2) did not apply because the use of the
104

See EM I, 473 F.3d at 468 (explaining that the Kirchner Decrees directed
the Ministry of Economy and Production to issue a resolution to BCRA requiring it to
repay the Republic’s debt to the IMF).
105
See 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2006) (applying special immunity provision to
central banks only, not other foreign states or instrumentalities).
106
See id. § 1610(a)(1)-(2).
107
See EM I, 473 F.3d at 475-86.
108
See id. at 474 & n.10 (explaining that under New York law “[w]hen a party
holds funds in a bank account, possession is established, and the presumption of
ownership follows”).
109
Id. at 474.
110
Id. at 475.
111
Id. For a more detailed discussion of the lack of central bank independence
in Latin America, see Harout Jack Samra, Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America: A
Survey and Case Studies, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2009).
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FRBNY’s monetary reserves to repay debt to the IMF was not
commercial activity.112 Here, the court distinguished IMF
payments from the “commercially-available debt instruments”
sold by Argentina to creditors in Weltover,113 where the Supreme
Court considered the debt instruments to be commercial
because they “may be held by private parties; they are
negotiable and may be traded on the international market . . . ;
and they promise a future stream of cash income.”114 In
contrast, the Second Circuit explained that the relationship of
Argentina to the IMF lacked these private-like qualities
because IMF membership extends only to sovereign nations;
the IMF’s mission is preservation of a stable international
monetary system; and IMF loans “are not available in the
commercial market.”115 In other words, even if past funds at the
FRBNY had serviced Argentina’s debt to the IMF, plaintiffs had
not shown that the $105 million of BCRA assets still in deposit
at the FRBNY were designated for IMF debt payments.116
Finally, mirroring LNC Investments, Inc. v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua,117 the Second Circuit addressed the
Republic’s explicit waiver of immunity from jurisdiction and
attachment, as well as the waiver’s applicability to the BCRA.118
In LNC Investments, a creditor sought to execute on the assets
of the Central Bank of Nicaragua.119 The court held that a
central bank’s assets could not be used to satisfy a judgment
against a parent government, even if the parent government
“waive[s] the immunity of its central bank pursuant to
§ 1611.”120 The court reasoned that § 1611 permits attachment
of such assets “when, and only when, the central bank or its
parent government has made an explicit waiver of the bank’s
immunity.”121 By raising this point, the court stated that plaintiffs

112

See EM I, 473 F.3d at 480-85.
Id. at 482-85.
114
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615 (1992).
115
EM I, 473 F.3d at 482-84. The court also addressed the commercial
question in the alternative, noting that it “would be required to hold that, on the
present record, the FRBNY Funds are not available for attachment under § 1610
because the FRBNY Funds were never used for commercial activity . . . .” Id. at 484.
116
See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
117
115 F. Supp. 2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 228 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2000) (per
curiam).
118
EM I, 473 F.3d at 485-86.
119
Id. at 361.
120
Id. at 486.
121
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting LNC Invs., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 362-63).
113
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should have relied on “well-established” Bancec principles rather
than focusing on commerciality and waiver arguments.122
Rather than suing the Republic and arguing that
ownership of the BCRA assets at the FRBNY had transferred
to the Republic, the court hinted that the plaintiffs should have
argued that the BCRA was the “alter ego” of the Republic,
thereby defeating the presumption that the BCRA deserved
“separate juridical status” and stripping it of the § 1611(b)(1)
central bank immunity.123 Under these circumstances, the
Republic’s waiver of immunity from attachment would apply to
the BCRA because the bank and parent government would be
“alter egos” of one another.124
B.

The NML Capital Decision (2006–2010)

Apparently the vulture funds had recognized the
efficacy of the “alter ego” argument before the 2007 EM I
opinion, because they filed a new action in 2006 “seeking a
declaratory judgment to the effect that BCRA is the alter ego of
the Republic.”125 Once again, Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
presided, holding that the BCRA was not entitled to separate
juridical status under Bancec.126 Under Bancec’s first prong,127
the court found that the BCRA was, in fact, the “alter ego” of
the Republic because the Republic expressly directed the BCRA
to pay the Republic’s IMF debt, the Republic was able to “draw
on the resources of the BCRA at will,” and the BCRA ignored
its mandate to operate independently of the Republic.128 Under
Bancec’s second prong,129 the court found such use of the BCRA
funds “contributed to fraud and injustice perpetrated . . . on the
bondholders” because the bonds gave rights of attachment and

122
123
124

Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 477-78.
For a discussion of the “alter ego” analysis, see Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 617-

18 (1983).
125

EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated sub nom. NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).
126
Id. at 273-74, 297-302.
127
See supra Part I.B.1.
128
EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 299-300. The court accurately described the
Republic’s control over the BCRA. The BCRA featured three “short-term
governors . . . marked by disagreement with the Republic over the BCRA’s
independence.” Id. at 281. The Argentine government since 2001 had enacted laws
giving the Republic increasing control over the BCRA. Id. at 284.
129
See supra Part I.B.1.
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execution that the Republic refused to honor.130 Accordingly, the
court held that the separate juridical status of the BCRA
should be disregarded because the Republic had explicitly
waived its immunity from suit and attachment, refused to pay
its debts in full, and then argued that its waiver did not apply
to the BCRA.131
Since the BCRA was the “alter ego” of the Republic, a
waiver of the Republic’s immunity would also apply to the
BCRA because the funds now belonged to the Republic, rather
than to the BCRA’s account.132 Attachment of the Republic’s
assets would be proper under § 1610(a), however, only if such
property was “used for a commercial activity” as interpreted by
Weltover.133 The court found that the $105 million on deposit at
the FRBNY had “the ability to earn a certain amount of income
on balances”134—a commercial activity “by which a private party
engages in trade and traffic or commerce.”135 Since the BCRA
and the Republic were “alter egos” under Bancec analysis, the
BCRA was no longer eligible for the special foreign central bank
immunity protection of § 1611(b)(1) and, instead, fell under the
attachment exceptions that would normally apply only to the
Republic’s commercial property in the United States.136 Since the
district court had considered the FRBNY accounts to be
commercial and the Republic had explicitly waived all
immunity, it concluded that the funds at the FRBNY were
subject to attachment.137
The Second Circuit vacated on appeal,138 focusing its
analysis on the statute itself, rather than on the Bancec
130

EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
Id. at 303-04.
132
Id. at 300-01.
133
Id. at 303; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006); Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1992).
134
EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
135
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614).
136
Id. at 303-04.
137
See id. at 303 (granting motions for attachment).
138
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172,
197 (2d Cir. 2011). Circuit Judge José A. Cabranes, who wrote the 2007 EM I decision
with Circuit Judges Ralph K. Winter and Rosemary S. Pooler, see EM I, 473 F.3d 463
(2d Cir. 2007), also wrote the 2011 NML Capital decision, this time with Circuit Judge
Roger Miner and Senior Circuit Judge Chester J. Straub. NML Capital, 652 F.3d at
174. In NML Capital, the Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s rationale
regarding claim preclusion. See id. at 185 (quoting Dayco Corp. v. Foreign Transactions
Corp., 705 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir.1983)). The District Court had held that claim preclusion
did not apply because “[t]he motions for attachments . . . made in December 2005 were
part of an ongoing process . . . [,] had no independent status as actions for
lawsuits . . . [,] did not lead to independent judgments. . . [, and] were nothing more nor
less than motions [without] final disposition . . . .” EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d. at 295. The
131
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precedent.139 In fact, the court rejected the idea of a Bancec-like
“independence requirement for the immunity of central bank
assets,”140 arguing instead that “the only qualification for
immunity under § 1611(b)(1) is whether the property of the
central bank is ‘held for its own account.’”141 First, the court
presumed that the funds at the FRBNY were held for the
BCRA’s own account because the account was “in the name of a
central bank.”142 But this presumption could be rebutted by a
showing that the FRBNY funds were “not being used for central
banking functions as such functions are normally understood,
irrespective of their ‘commercial’ nature.”143
Although the FSIA does not mention the concept of
“normally understood . . . central bank[] functions,”144 the court
adopted a “modified test”—combining analysis of the “plain
language” of the statute with the “central bank activities
test”—to determine whether central bank property is ‘held for
its own account.’”145 Here, the parties had stipulated in March
2009 that the BCRA derived the FRBNY-held funds, in part,
from accumulating foreign exchange reserves to regulate the
Argentine peso and regulating “the custody of cash reserves of
commercial banks,” both of which are “paradigmatic central
banking functions.”146 As a result, the court ruled that these
appellate court also addressed issue preclusion, holding that it did not apply because
“the legal and factual issues presented in the two cases are very different.” NML
Capital, 652 F.3d at 186. While EM I focused on asset ownership and the noncommercial nature of IMF debt, 473 F.3d at 476-85, the Bancec motions of NML
Capital dealt with plaintiffs’ “alter ego” theory and “[were] not litigated, much less
decided . . . , by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .” NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 186
(citations omitted).
139
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 188.
140
Id.; see also id. at 190 (citations omitted) (explaining that when the FSIA
was passed in 1976, central banks were more dependent on their parent governments).
141
Id. at 188.
142
Id. at 194.
143
Id.; see also id. at 194 n.20 (explaining that the court “recognize[s] that
there is no definitive list of activities ‘normally understood’ to be central banking
functions . . . , [but] even in unusual circumstances it is not difficult to tell whether a
central bank is engaged in a function characteristic of central banks”).
144
See Ernest T. Patrikis, Foreign Central Bank Property: Immunity from
Attachment in the United States, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 274, 277 (1982) (regarding
“central bank activities” to include: “(1) issue of notes, coin, and legal tender, (2)
custody and administration of the nation’s monetary reserves through the holding of
gold, silver, domestic and foreign securities, foreign exchange, . . . and other credit
instruments . . . , (3) establishment and maintenance of reserves of depository
institutions, (4) discounts and advances to depository institutions, (5) receipt of
deposits from the government, international organizations, depository institutions, and
in special cases, private persons, (6) open market operations, (7) credit controls, and (8)
licensing, supervision, and inspection of banks”).
145
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146
Id. at 195.
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assets were “held for [the BCRA’s] own account” under
§ 1611(b)(1) because, regardless of their commerciality, both
activities were typical of central banks.147
Finally, the court concluded that although the Republic
waived its FSIA immunity, its waiver “did not mention the
[Republic’s] instrumentalities . . . or the BCRA in particular . . . .”148
Since the Republic’s waiver was “worded broadly, it d[id] not
appear to clearly and unambiguously waive BCRA’s immunity
from attachment, as it must do in order to be effective.”149 Therefore,
the court held that the remaining $105 million in FRBNY funds
were immune from attachment by the vulture funds.150
III.

FSIA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

After more than thirty years of FSIA litigation, FSIA
jurisprudence remains uncertain.151 After the NML Capital
decision, key terms in the FSIA are still subject to various
judicial interpretations, and the rights and obligations of
debtors and creditors under the FSIA remain ambiguous.152
Although some of this confusion may be attributed to the fact
that most FSIA cases implicate cross-border transactions of
significant financial and political complexity, the ambiguity of
certain provisions of the statute, especially the definition of key
terms in § 1603, makes interpretation more difficult.
A.

The Confusion

The distinction between a “foreign state” and an “agency
or instrumentality” is important because § 1610 makes it easier
to attach the property of an agency or instrumentality than the
property of a foreign state.153 However, § 1603 does not
147

Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 196.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See generally, e.g., Working Group, supra note 39, at 595-617.
152
For a broader perspective on the uncertain role of FSIA in cross-border
restructuring disputes, see Steven M. Davidoff, In Court Battle, a Game of Brinkmanship
with Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/11/27/in-court-battle-a-game-of-brinkmanship-with-argentina/.
153
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2006) (permitting an exception to
immunity from attachment of foreign state property in the United States used for a
commercial activity if “the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim was based” (emphasis added)), with § 1610(b)(2) (permitting an
exception to immunity from attachment of the property in the United States of a
commercially-engaged agency or instrumentality of the agency “regardless of whether
the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based” (emphasis
148

1118

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:3

adequately define “foreign state,” mentioning only that it
“includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”154 Such fact-specific
inquiries into the internal governance structures of foreign
nations could be complex and delicate from the perspective of
foreign relations.155
The ambiguity of what constitutes a “political
subdivision” and the status of an agency or instrumentality as
a foreign state may also create legal arguments that Congress
did not intend. For example, a sovereign defendant could argue
that even though Congress drafted specific attachment provisions
for agencies and instrumentalities, the broader attachment
immunity granted to foreign states should apply to agencies and
instrumentalities.156 As a result, any strategy aimed at clarifying
the FSIA would need to be both specific and flexible.157
B.

Potential Solutions
1. Drop “Agency”

The term “agency” is misleading and should be dropped
in favor of “instrumentality” alone.158 The confusion over the
meaning of “agency” derives from two sources. First, and not
surprising given that the current definition of foreign state
includes agencies and instrumentalities,159 “the use of the term
‘agency’ . . . appeared to include departments or ministries that
were intended to be part of the foreign state.”160 Second, the
distinction between foreign states and agencies or
added)); see also Working Group, supra note 39, at 585 (noting that § 1610(a)(2) is
unnecessarily difficult because “[o]nly in rare instances would a foreign state have
property in the United States . . . ‘used’ for the activity giving rise to the
claim . . . . [because] [i]n many cases, such as those involving a foreign state’s failure to
pay for U.S. goods or services or breach of an employment contract or lease, no property
of the foreign state related to the claim exists at all, much less in the United States”).
154
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
155
See Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.
2008) (explaining that the Saudi Arabian National Guard “is considered a political
subdivision of [a] foreign state under the [FSIA]”); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea
Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that “the Bolivian Air Force is a
‘foreign state or political subdivision’”).
156
The statute again highlights this confusion by stating that the more
narrow immunity afforded to agencies and instrumentalities by section § 1610(b)
governs “[i]n addition to [the more broad immunity granted by] subsection (a).” 28
U.S.C. § 1610(a)-(b).
157
See Working Group, supra note 39, at 508.
158
See id.
159
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
160
See Working Group, supra note 39, at 508.
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instrumentalities partially rests on whether the agency or
instrumentality is a legal person separate from its parent
government.161 To determine whether the presumption of
separate legal personhood has been overcome, the Bancec
Court outlined an “alter ego” test,162 which would create a
principal-agent relationship if satisfied.163 This is confusing
because the FSIA uses “agency” to mean a legally separate
entity while Bancec uses the term “agent” to refer to a nonlegally separate entity.164 Dropping “agency” in favor of the term
“instrumentality” would resolve this confusion.165
2. The “Core Function Test”
One group of scholars has identified a pattern whereby
courts applied either a “core function test” or a “legal
characteristics test” to distinguish a foreign state from an
instrumentality.166 The former test, applied in Transaero, Inc. v.
La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana,167 looks at the “core function” of the
entity: if the core function is governmental, the entity is a
foreign state; if the core function is commercial, the entity is an
instrumentality.168 A report published by the American Bar
Association (ABA Report) rightly criticized this approach
because it was “duplicative of the commercial activity analysis
required at a later stage of litigation . . . .”169 Since the core
function test would have already classified governmental,
noncommercial entities as foreign states, the test would defeat
all subsequent FSIA commercial activity provisions for foreign
states. As such, the statute would rarely subject a foreign state
to a commercial activity exception to immunity because foreign
states are rarely, if ever, commercial under the test. The
statute includes commercial activity exceptions for foreign
states, and therefore, application of the core functions test
would defeat statutory intent.
161

28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
See Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983).
163
See id.; supra Part I.B.1.
164
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b), with Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629.
165
See Working Group, supra note 39, at 508.
166
Id. at 509.
167
30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
168
See id. at 153 (applying the core functions test to hold that the Bolivian Air
Force was a foreign state because it was “so closely bound up with the structure of the
state that they must in all cases be considered as the ‘foreign state’ itself, rather than a
separate ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state”).
169
Working Group, supra note 39, at 514.
162
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3. The “Legal Characteristics Test”
The “legal characteristics test,” which analyzes the legal
rights of governmental entities, is a better alternative in light
of its case-by-case approach.170 If the entity is able to “sue and be
sued, own property, and contract, all in its own name,”171 it is an
instrumentality.172 Other legal characteristics analyzed may
include “whether the entity maintains a distinct personality, was
sufficiently capitalized, observes corporate formalities, [and]
maintains corporate records . . . whether and to what extent the
entity provides its own financing or receives government
appropriations, and whether the entity hires public employees.”173
The ABA Report, however, recommends weighing an
additional factor better left out of any proposed revision to the
FSIA. The report includes “whether the state’s assets would be
subject to execution if the plaintiff obtained judgment against
the foreign entity” as a relevant factor.174 Such a determination
would require courts to analyze the attachment provisions of
§ 1610, which differ for foreign states and instrumentalities.175
In other words, resolving entity status ought not to rest on a
factor partially dependent on that very same decision.
4. One Proposed Revision
Despite this complication, the fact-intensive “totality of
the circumstances” approach of the “legal characteristics test”
should be codified in the statute. The relevant § 1603 provisions,
as envisioned by the ABA Report’s amendments, would read:
For purposes of this chapter—
(a) A “foreign state” includes its government and political
subdivisions, departments, ministries, armed services, and
independent regulatory agencies. . . . Foreign state does not include
an instrumentality of the state.
(b) An “instrumentality” of a foreign state means any entity that—
170

Id.
Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that Finland’s Government Guarantee Fund was an instrumentality because, among
other characteristics, it “may own shares in deposit banks and asset management
companies”).
172
See Working Group, supra note 39, at 512 (citing Unidyne Corp. v.
Aerolineas Argentinas, 590 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1984)).
173
Id. at 515.
174
Id.
175
See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006).
171
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(1) is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) is an organ of a foreign state or has a majority of its shares
or other ownership interest owned directly, or indirectly through
one or more other instrumentalities, by one or more foreign
states, and
(3) is created under the laws of one or more of the states to which
section 1603(b)(2) refers and is not a citizen of a State of the
United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title.176

Since foreign central banks do not fit into any of the categories
outlined in revised subsection (a), it seems clear that foreign
central banks would be instrumentalities, especially in light of
the legislative history of the FSIA and modern central bank
practice.177 Nevertheless, the court in NML Capital disagreed.178
C.

The FSIA for Foreign Central Banks: Where to Start?

The term “central bank” is neither defined in § 1603 nor
explicitly included in the definitions of “foreign state” or
“instrumentality.” Parties to the NML Capital decision did not
disagree that the BCRA was an instrumentality, because the
BCRA needed to be an instrumentality in order to decide the
Bancec motions before the court.179 Instead, the parties argued
176

Working Group, supra note 39, at 597-98. The phrase “or instrumentality”
would also need to be inserted after the term “a foreign state” in §§ 1604, 1605, and
1609, to ensure that instrumentalities qualify for the general grants of immunity and
the jurisdictional exceptions. See id. at 599, 611.
177
See Lee, supra note 37, at 350 n.81 (quoting the FSIA legislative history,
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614, which states
that entities defined as instrumentalities “could assume a variety of forms, including a
state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a
shipping line or airline, a steel company, [or] a central bank . . . .”).
It is possible, but unlikely, that in a particular instance a foreign central
bank might be deemed to be part of the foreign state itself, comparable to the
case of a ministry of finance or treasury. In modern practice, a central bank is
much more likely to be organized as a separate entity, at least in part
because some degree of separation from the government is perceived as
important to the credible conduct of monetary policy by a central bank.
Id.
178

NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172,
187-88 (2d Cir. 2011) (arguing that foreign central banks do not need instrumentalitylike independence as described in Bancec in order to be immune from attachment).
179
Compare Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees EM Ltd. and NML Capital, Ltd. at
64-65, NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 172 (No. 10-1487-cv(L)) [hereinafter Brief for EM &
NML Capital] (inferring that the BCRA is an instrumentality under Bancec), with
Brief for Defendant-Appellant The Republic of Argentina at 3, NML Capital, 652 F.3d
at 172 (No. 10-1487) [hereinafter Brief for Republic of Argentina] (“BCRA is an agency
or instrumentality of the Republic . . . .”).
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over whether the Republic, indisputably a “foreign state,”180
avoided its “obligations by engaging in abuses of corporate
form”181 such that the judicial separateness of the BCRA,
indisputably an “instrumentality,”182 should be set aside under
Bancec. Despite the fact that the BCRA’s instrumentality
status was not in dispute, the court distinguished “generic”
from “special” instrumentalities:
We hold that the plain language, history, and structure of
§ 1611(b)(1) immunizes property of a foreign central bank or
monetary authority held for its own account without regard to
whether the bank or authority is independent from its parent state
pursuant to Bancec . . . . [F]oreign central banks are not treated as
generic “agencies and instrumentalities” of a foreign state under the
FSIA; they are given “special protections” befitting the particular
sovereign interest in preventing the attachment and execution of
central bank property.183

The court’s interpretation meant that the immunityfrom-attachment analysis for a foreign central bank was
fundamentally different from the analysis for another
instrumentality. The court noted that, by including
§ 1611(b)(1), the statute treats central banks differently from
other instrumentalities by not making the “immunity of a
central bank’s property contingent on the independence of the
central bank.”184
By beginning the analysis with § 1611(b)(1) instead of a
Bancec analysis, the court injected new force into that
provision and effectively protected central banks’ assets from
attachment as long as (1) the foreign central bank or parent
government had not explicitly waived the central bank’s
180

Compare Brief for EM and NML Capital, supra note 179, at 54-55
(inferring that the Republic is a foreign state under Bancec), with Brief for Republic of
Argentina, supra note 179, at 29 (“BCRA is an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the
Republic . . . .”).
181
Brief for EM and NML Capital, supra note 179, at 54-55 (quoting De
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
182
Compare id. at 64-65 (inferring that the BCRA is an instrumentality under
Bancec), with Brief for Republic of Argentina, supra note 179, at 3 (“BCRA is an agency
or instrumentality of the Republic . . . .”); see also Brief for Republic of Argentina, supra
note 180, at 29 (“It also cannot be disputed that BCRA is an ‘agency or instrumentality’
of the Republic under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) . . . .”); S & S Machinery Co. v.
Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1983) (“State-owned central banks
indisputably are included in the [FSIA’s] definition of ‘agency or instrumentality.’”
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
183
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 187-88 (emphasis added).
184
Id. at 190.
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immunity,185 and (2) the foreign central bank “held [the assets
in question] for its own account,”186 which the court interpreted
to mean “traditional activities of central banks.”187 In effect, the
court’s interpretation made §§ 1603 and 1610 much less
relevant for foreign central bank immunity from attachment.188
While foreign central banks continued to be instrumentalities,
they were special because § 1611(b)(1) protected foreign central
bank property “[n]otwithstanding the [attachment] provisions
of section 1610.”189 The weight of this phrase is strong,
eliminating the need to analyze the commerciality of central
bank property, so long as such property is “held for [the foreign
central bank’s] own account.”190 As a result, the court successfully
crafted a fine judicial distinction between central banks and
other instrumentalities, while accurately interpreting the FSIA’s
plain language in the process.
IV.

STALEMATE

For more than ten years, Argentina and its creditors
have battled in domestic courts around the world and through
international dispute resolution forums with no end in sight.191
185

See 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (providing foreign central bank property is
immune from attachment “unless such bank or authority, or its parent foreign
government, has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment”).
186
NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 195.
187
See id. at 191-95 (citing Patrikis, supra note 144, at 274 n.37, and
employing Patrikis’s concept of normally understood central banking functions).
188
See id. at 197 (summarizing the court’s holdings without reference to
§§ 1603 and 1610).
189
28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
190
Id.
191
$2.6 billion of judgments have been entered in both New York State and
U.S. federal courts, and most remain unpaid. See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.6.
After NML Capital, the highest court in Switzerland held that Argentine funds moved
from the FRBNY to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland
were immune from attachment. See Argentina’s Debt Default: Gauchos and Gadflies,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 91, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
%21533453 [hereinafter Gauchos and Gadflies]. Responding to the adverse Swiss
judgment, the vulture funds “have brought a case against Switzerland at the European
Court of Human Rights, under Article 6 of the human-rights convention, which
guarantees the right to a fair hearing.” Id.
Because Argentina has not recognized these judgments, the U.S.
government has refused to consider a restructuring of its own credit arrangements
with Argentina until the ICSID and U.S. court judgments are paid. See Sens. Rubio (RFL), Gillibrand (D-NY) and Menendez (D-NJ) Urge U.S. Treasury to Accord Equal
Importance to Argentine Debts Owed to Paris Club Governments and Private U.S. Lenders,
PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sens-rubio-r-flgillibrand-d-ny-and-menendez-d-nj-urge-us-treasury-to-accord-equal-importance-toargentine-debts-owed-to-paris-club-governments-and-private-us-lenders-136963093.html
(“Following the Obama Administration’s announcement that it would oppose new loans
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While the vulture funds have had modest successes in their
attachment efforts,192 it would be a stretch to call their efforts
successful.193 On the other side, Argentina has damaged its
reputation as a responsible financial partner.194 Courts in the
United States and abroad are caught in the middle of these
disputes and often reach incongruous results, even within the
same jurisdiction. While the Second Circuit’s NML Capital
decision protected Argentine assets from creditors, the same
court’s recent interpretation of pari passu clauses in Argentine
bond documents constituted a victory for holdout creditors such
as the vulture funds.195 Rather than clarifying the murkier
waters of global finance, the various interpretations of the
to Argentina, American Task Force Argentina (ATFA) today applauded Senators Marco
Rubio (R-FL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) for urging the
U.S. Treasury to formally adopt the policy of withholding approval of a Paris Club deal
for Argentina until Argentina has satisfied all awards under bilateral investment
treaties and outstanding U.S. court judgments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
ATFA is a creditors’ lobby devoted to pursuing “a just and fair reconciliation” of the 2001
Argentine debt default. About Us, AM. TASK FORCE ARGENTINA, http://www.atfa.org/
about-us/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
192
See Argentines Wielded Guns to Stop Moving of Ship in Ghana-Report,
REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/argentinabonds-ghana-ship-idUSL1E8M97U520121109 (NML Capital, Ltd. successfully
petitioned a Ghanaian court to allow attachment of an Argentine naval ship docked in
Ghana in satisfaction of NML’s outstanding judgments); see also Gauchos and Gadflies,
supra note 191 (“Some $90m was seized from the New York trustee with which shares
of a privatised Argentine bank had been deposited. And a few million dollars were
grabbed from a science-ministry account, used to buy telescopes, at an American
branch of another bank. Among the assets that the holdouts have tried and so far failed
to get are shipments of natural gas and satellites. Lawyers spent many hours arguing
over whether the satellites, part of a multi-governmental project, should be considered
Argentine and commercial.”). On July 6, 2011, one day after the NML Capital decision,
the United Kingdom’s highest court held that one of the vulture funds’ U.S. judgments
was enforceable against Argentina’s assets in the United Kingdom. See NML Capital
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, [2011] UKSC 31. “Eager to kick up as big a stink as
possible, they have even filed a criminal money-laundering complaint against unknown
individuals at the BIS.” Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191. Judgments against
Argentina by American and foreign creditors have been entered through the World
Bank’s arbitration forum, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). Id. “Some cases, such as the ICSID one, look set to rumble on for at
least another five years.” Id.
193
See Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191.
194
Jude Webber, Fernández Wins Re-election in Argentina, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 24,
2011, 6:42 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e26c1546-fdc5-11e0-b6d9-00144feabdc0.html
(“Though it has restructured most of its defaulted debt, Argentina’s international
reputation has not recovered and it may yet be blocked from returning to capital
markets by litigious holdouts.”).
195
See Davidoff, supra note 152 (Elliot and Aurelius argued that “if Argentina
paid any money on its new bonds [i.e., those issued post-restructuring] it also had to
pay the old defaulted holders.”). In essence, the holdouts want the pari passu clauses
“interpreted in a way that secures them a 100% payout when Argentina next services
its restructured debt. That would jeopardise all of the restructuring done to date.”
Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191.
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FSIA, and the inability to enforce those interpretations, leave
all parties at a stalemate. Consequently, neither side has
leverage to negotiate, proposed solutions fail, and political and
economic realities often dwarf legal considerations.196
A.

No Incentives

Despite the legal and financial complexities of the
decade-long litigation, the reason why the parties have reached
an impasse is surprisingly straightforward—a lack of pressure
to negotiate.197 Creditors refuse to settle for less than the full
amount due, while sovereign debtors demand settlement on their
own terms, realizing that foreign judgments are unenforceable
against them.198 While sovereign debt restructurings sometimes
create incentives for creditors to work with a debtor,199 those
incentives may be absent for lenders, such as vulture funds,
who seek “the highest immediate return” on their investments,
view regulation as a nuisance, and have little sympathy for
their sophisticated, sovereign counterparties who claim that
they cannot afford to honor their agreements.200
However, the vulture fund strategy is not without legal
precedent. In Elliot Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nación,201 a
fund associated with financier Paul Singer purchased
discounted Peruvian debt and sought to enforce the original
agreement’s more favorable terms.202 While the district court
denied Elliot’s request (because it found that the fund had the
intent to sue at the time of the purchase),203 the Second Circuit

196

See Davidoff, supra note 152 (“Hernán Lorenzino, Argentina’s economy
minister, reacted angrily to the [pari passu] decisions, saying that they were ‘a kind of
legal colonialism . . . .’”).
197
See Horacio T. Liendo III, Sovereign Debt Litigation Problems in the United
States: A Proposed Solution, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 107, 127-8 (2007).
198
Id. Despite the unenforceability of U.S. judgments against Argentina,
Argentina’s default and its refusal to pay the holdout vulture fund creditors has affected its
stock market and given the country a reputation as an untrustworthy borrower in the
international capital markets. See Davidoff, supra note 152; Jude Webber, Argentina’s Capital
Market Challenges, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 2010, 7:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a96448687e28-11df-94a8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Len1mgr3.
199
See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role
of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1089 (2004)
(discussing incentives to negotiation, such as desire to seek equal treatment to reduce
cost and risk).
200
Id. at 1090.
201
194 F.3d 363, 381 (2d Cir. 1999).
202
See Liendo, supra note 197, at 125 (citing Elliot Assocs. L.P. v. Banco de la
Nación, 948 F.3d 1203, 1205-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev’d, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999)).
203
Id.
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reversed.204 And although other creditors accepted Peru’s
restructuring offer,205 Elliot eventually “wrung a settlement from
Peru [in 2000] worth five times what it had paid . . . in 1996.”206
Elliot’s court victory and successful holdout strategy
may be the only path for holdout creditors because their other
recourse, refusing to lend to untrustworthy borrowers, may
“lose[] force . . . when measured against economic distress or
outstanding political benefits” within the debtor nation.207
Argentina’s actions in the wake of its 2001 default
reinforce the idea that responding to an angry electorate at
home may trump the collateral damage of diminished access to
the international capital markets. Faced with high rates of
unemployment and buoyed by the IMF’s self-critique of its role
in creating the crisis,208 Argentine leaders benefited politically
by (1) blaming the IMF for its role in the crisis,209 and (2)
maintaining a hard line against unpopular vulture funds210
whose ties to the United States have soured foreign relations.211
One commentator views this hard line as an effort “to
discourage creditors from the conduct . . . of the creditors in
Elliot,”212—an approach that backfired during Argentina’s
unilateral “take it or leave it” restructuring proposal in 2005,213
which was met with lower rates of creditor acceptance than
other restructuring countries214 and a decade of mounting U.S.,

204

Id.
See id. at 125.
206
Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191, at 125.
207
See Liendo, supra note 197, at 132.
208
See Argentina Blames IMF for Crisis, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3941809.stm.
209
See Argentina’s Kirchner Boosts Approval on IMF Clashes, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
6, 2004), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afHs6wHOB6JI.
210
See El Gobierno Prepara una Nueva Ofensiva contra Fondos Buitre, DIARIO
BAE (Arg.), Sept. 15, 2011, available at http://www.diariobae.com/diario/2011/09/15/
1417-el-gobierno-prepara-una-nueva-ofensiva-contra-fondos-buitre.html (translated by
the author).
211
See Ana Baron, Esperan Tiempos Difíciles en la Relación con el Banco
Mundial, CLARIN (Arg.) (Jan. 7, 2012, 1:30 AM), http://www.ieco.clarin.com/
economia/Esperan-dificiles-relacion-Banco-Mundial_0_623337778.html (explaining that
an American candidate to replace the World Bank Director for Argentina withdrew due
to fallout from the Obama Administration’s decision to deny new loans to Argentina
until U.S. court and arbitration judgments are paid) (translated by the author).
212
Liendo, supra note 197, at 134.
213
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
214
Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors:
Implications of Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 326 fig.4 (2005) (chart
showing that “Argentina’s 76% acceptance rate [in 2005] was the lowest [by 17 points]
among six countries [with restructurings] in eight years.”); Liendo, supra note 197, at
134 n.115.
205
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foreign, and international court judgments.215 In effect, the
vulture funds have decided that the only way to fully vindicate
their rights is to pursue an uncompromising global litigation
strategy.216
B.

Inadequate Solutions

One solution to the stalemate is an international
bankruptcy model that has roots in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s
Chapter 11 framework for corporate restructurings.217 On one
level, such a framework seems necessary because no such
international enforcement mechanism exists with the ability to
penalize a sovereign borrower.218 One of the unique features of a
corporate restructuring is the debtor’s ability to maintain
control of the business and secure private funding for the
reorganization.219 A parallel path could be created for bankrupt
nations in which private capital markets would finance the
sovereign restructuring, preventing the “moral hazard” that
may occur when sovereign debtors manage their finances
irresponsibly in reliance on an eventual IMF bailout.220 Though
proposals for such a framework, known as the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), rely on a plan negotiated by
a majority that would be binding on all creditors, it is likely to
cause opposition by minority creditors such as the vulture funds.
Responses to the current stalemate that propose the use
of voluntary exchange offers and exit consents221 or contractbased collective action clauses (CACs)222 are also inadequate.
215

See Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191.
“Holdout litigation” may also be desirable from a market perspective. Some
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Argentina used exchange offers and exit consents in its 2005
and 2010 restructurings, but the vulture funds rejected any
restructuring that offered less than the full value on the
original terms of the bonds.223 Similar to the SDRM, CACs bind
minority creditors to majority decisions, an approach that does
not fit the complex reality of creditor interests in the Argentine
restructuring, which included 152 bond issues, seven currencies,
and the laws of eight countries.224
C.

Policy Considerations

Aware of the inadequacy of these approaches, vulture
funds rely on the belief that U.S. courts will vindicate their
rights through the FSIA. However, Judge Thomas P. Griesa of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
who presided over most of the litigation and entered several
judgments in favor of the vulture funds, has often reminded
plaintiffs that “they have rights but may not have remedies.”225
His words became particularly prescient when the NML
Capital decision gave new force to foreign central bank
immunity from attachment,226 a position that the FRBNY and
the U.S. government supported as amici curiae.227 In light of the
bipartisan political support for refusing to loan money to
Argentina until it pays its U.S. court judgments,228 the amicus
briefs on Argentina’s behalf seem contradictory. While the
power of the creditors’ lobby in Washington may explain recent
political support,229 an even more commanding influence drives
in favor of protecting Argentine assets in the United States—
namely, the goal of maintaining international funds in the
United States.230 When foreign funds at the FRBNY are placed
at risk of attachment, uncertainty causes foreign officials to
withdraw funds, potentially having “an unsettling effect on
foreign exchange markets . . . [,] international monetary
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stability,” and “the U.S. balance of payments.”231 As assets leave
the United States for safer jurisdictions, such as Switzerland’s
attachment-proof Bank of International Settlements,232 the
flight may begin to affect the value and preeminence of the
dollar. Although the Second Circuit based its statutory
interpretation of foreign central bank immunity from
attachment on the “plain language” of the FSIA,233 these
enormous political and economic factors can be powerful
drivers behind courts’ reasoning.
CONCLUSION
Foreign central banks present challenging issues for
purposes of sovereign immunity. As a banking entity, the
central bank is commercial by nature—a fact that Congress
accounted for when it drafted the special foreign central bank
provisions of § 1611(b)(1).234 Unless there has been an explicit
waiver of a foreign central bank’s immunity, courts should
follow the NML Capital precedent and grant broad immunity
to the assets of foreign central banks in the United States. In
the unlikely event that Congress moves immediately to amend
the statute, there are strong legal, political, and economic
arguments for interpreting § 1611(b)(1) as a bulwark against
the attachment of foreign central bank assets in the United
States. As disgruntled creditors begin to realize that the
United States has strong incentives to protect foreign central
bank assets and foreign nations start to understand the severe
impact of default on their reputation as credible borrowers,
each party should develop renewed incentives to negotiate
disputes and continue participation in international capital
markets. Until then, the blame game will continue.
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